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Abstract: This paper is an examination of the notions of law, the Rule
of Law, and commercial practice in the West and China. The paper outlines
the basic philosophical principles and legal concomitants of the Rule of
Law, and the corollary Chinese principles and concomitants. It examines
the traditions, differences, and similarities in thinking about the issues in
each tradition. It then examines the implications of these differences in
commercial dispute resolution. After this discussion of traditions,
similarities, and differences and their impact on commercial dispute
resolution, the paper turns to address how the discrepancies could be dealt
with in the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Rule of Law in the West is deeply entrenched in the legal system
and is one of the fundamental assumptions about how relationships are to
be conducted. In a sense, it is a part of Western culture, and in particular
Western commercial culture. In its essence, the Western notion is that
while power and influence certainly operate in all relationships, all of these
relationships in turn are governed by or based upon the law. Law is seen to
be independent of the power and influence of the members of society,
including the government, and something that has the ability to control
government action. By way of contrast, in China, although it has
experimented with the notion at different times in its history, currently the
Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") is the basis of power and influence as
well as the basis of all law. In essence, therefore, the law has been a tool of
the CCP. While the CCP has been seeking to change this status, change is
still at an inchoate stage, and as a result, for foreign commercial interests,
access to predictable legal outcomes and enforcement has been very
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limited.
The China-Australia Free Trade Agreement ("FTA")' presumably, the
first of many such bilateral trade agreements with Western nations, will
require China to address this problem of legal certainty much more directly
than it has to date under the World Trade Organization ("WTO"). The FTA
requires such action because it will likely permit individual corporations
and corporate interests to litigate on their own behalf, while the WTO
dispute resolution mechanism is long, drawn out, and requires high-level
government involvement.2 Such being the case, both China and Australia
will find their laws and assumptions tested relatively soon. This fact places
an imperative on the Chinese government and its negotiators to consider the
status of the Chinese legal system in their negotiations and to negotiate
wisely with respect to jurisdiction and remedies to be provided in the FTA.
Furthermore, it places certain imperatives on Australian and other Western
negotiators who will need to review the same matters from their own
perspective.
This paper examines the legal and commercial norms in their socio-
political contexts with due regard to the relevant intellectual history. After
a brief discussion of methodology, Part II turns to examine the different
situations, connections and relationships between government and the
governed in the West and China. Part III then examines the notion of law
in both Western and Chinese traditions. Part IV turns to consider the two
traditions' approaches to the notion of Rule of Law, after which Part V
offers a review of traditions of commerce and commercial dispute
resolution. Finally, Part VI offers some suggestions for commercial dispute
resolution provisions in trade agreements between China and Western
nations.
II. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS & CONTEXT
A. A Note on Theories and Method
Law, whether viewed as an instrument of government control or a
responsibility of government in terms of its administration, imports its own
set of assumptions and imperatives. It holds brilliant promise but carries
with it a multiplicity of thorny problems. The promise and the problems sit
equally on the laps of governments, scholars and citizens alike. Each of the
1 See Australia, Gov't Dep't of Foreign Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/
china/fta/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
2 See WTO Legal Texts-A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round,
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal_e/ursume.htm#Understanding (last visited Jan.
18, 2006). See also Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property
in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131 (2000).
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Western and Chinese governments approach and deal with their
responsibilities differently and these approaches form the basis from which
each deals with law. These various views are also shared by scholars and
cause great difficulty when conducting comparative work.3 Each scholar
comes to a problem with her or his own mindset, point of view,
assumptions, and understanding of the law. Not only is this plethora of
views evident within legal traditions,4 but it greatly and perhaps excessively
influences and thwarts comparative work-the present piece making no
claim to exception.
The method I have adopted is to attempt to develop an understanding
of and to situate each of the parties in their historical-legal contexts and
then draw out the fault lines as to where they may meet. In doing so, every
effort will be made to avoid the more common pitfalls of such comparative
work 5-recognizing that such interpretive work is, as comparative literature
scholar Zhang Longxi observes, "a continuous intellectual endeavour [and]
nothing but the rigorous critique of misunderstanding, misrepresentation,
and all sorts of cultural myths and misconceptions., 6  Certainly, the
concepts of "China" and the "West," although having geographical
referents, are also cultural myths and social constructs. These myths, when
handled carefully, can assist in critiquing rather than supporting
misunderstanding. It is with this in mind that the terms "China" (meaning
primarily mainland China but also its traditions as carried elsewhere), the
"West" (meaning Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) and
"Anglo" (meaning the United Kingdom, United States and countries relying
on the English common-law tradition) are used. It is to be understood that
these are but constructs that hide as much as they reveal of the multi-faceted
people, cultures and institutions that make up each grouping. They are not
intended to be complete and correct descriptors of actual uni-dimensionsal
monolithic societies and cultures. Undoubtedly, many Chinese will have
views described herein as "Western" and vice-versa: the emphasis of this
3 H. Patrick Glenn's work, Legal Traditions of the World, is a particularly refreshing
approach to addressing this problem. H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD
(2nd ed. 2004). Glenn's view of law is that it forms the normative element in a society and
so permits comparative work to be undertaken not as comparing rule with rule and code with
code, but with systems of social ordering, institutions, and people's response over time.
4 Consider, for example, M.D.A. Freeman's masterful 7th edition of Lloyd's Introduction
to Jurisprudence. Some 1500 pages of text, excerpts, and commentary attempting to provide
a rough sampling of most theories with the hope that the text will whet the appetite, for
"whole libraries of jurisprudence are there to be sampled and enjoyed." M.D.A. FREEMAN,
LLOYD'S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE, at vi (7th ed. 2001).
5 Note the challenge to, and enlightening discussion of, such work in Teemu Ruskola,
Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
6 ZHANG LONGXI, MIGHTY OPPOSITES: FROM DICHOTOMIES TO DIFFERENCES IN THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CHINA 2 (1998).
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paper is on difference and how those differences may have a practical
impact on certain disputes.
Accordingly, before moving to a direct discussion of law, it is
necessary to put the law into its larger socio-political context, namely the
role of law in society, prior to discussing the much more particularized,
political and culturally informed notion of the Rule of Law. Both the West
and China have organized social and political forces in different ways
which have direct, complex, and broad influence determining the role of
law in their respective societies. In the broadest of terms, the West is based
on beliefs of individualism and separation whereas China has a tradition of
unity and collectivity.7 We now turn to a further investigation and
discussion of these differences.
B. Context
'1. West: Separation of Powers-Legislative, Judicial & Executive Branch
Western governments tend to be organized around the idea of
separation of powers 8 for the purposes of accountability and control. 9 One
may consider the case of Australia as an example.' The Australian
governmental system is based on constitutional federalism." That is, the
Australian government's power rests on the basis of a constitution which
was created by the states that banded together in order to form the
federation. The Australian constitution follows the traditional Anglo
attempt to limit the power of the political party in control of the government
by separating the powers and making them independent of the party in
control of government, to varying degrees.
This doctrine of separation of powers, the origins of which are lost in
the centuries of history, 12 was articulated powerfully by the English legal
7 G. HOFSTEDE, SOFTWARE OF THE MIND (1991).
8 In the West, this notion was most forcefully advanced by Montesquie in his The Spirit
of the Laws, in 1748. See generally BARON DE MONTESQUIE, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Hafner
Publ'g Co. 1949) (1748).
9 M. J. C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 1 (1967).
10 The United States and the former U.K. colonies developed differently, with the
colonies adopting a much softer form of separation of powers. In Australia and other former
colonies it is argued the executive and legislative branches have not been separated
sufficiently to claim a separation of powers doctrine. See generally Anthony Mason, A New
Perspective on Separation of Powers, 82 CANBERRA BULLETIN OF PUBLIC ADMIN. 1, 5-6
(1996).
11 C. SAUNDERS, IT'S YOUR CONSTITUTION: GOVERNING AUSTRALIA TODAY 13-18 (2d ed.
2003).
12 See VILE, supra note 9, at 2-3.
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theorist A.V. Dicey.13 Dicey argued that the organizers of the English legal
system recognized that the concentration of power had a number of
consequences, including the inability to make the government responsible
to the people, and the tendency toward dictatorships, despots and tyrants.
1 4
These outcomes were seen as undesirable from the perspective of the
English social contract philosophers who held that governments had their
legitimacy, at least in part, from the people.' 5 After the monarchies were
overthrown in France and England, this legitimacy was granted to a
government by the people via elections.
Accordingly, the legislative function was granted to the elected
officials who were presumed to act on behalf of the citizens. They were
expected to create legislation which advanced the interests of the people
whom they represented. The legislators were not permitted simply to enact
any legislation that seemed right to them or pleased the people: their
legislative powers were limited by the constitution and supervised by the
judiciary.
In the common law tradition, the judiciary has been an independent
governmental body for centuries, although its independence is a curious
type. Judges are selected in the common law tradition and appointed by
parties in power; however, once appointed, these judges are independent, at
least nominally, because they are free from interference or further influence
with respect to their judgments by either the party appointing them or the
government in power. Judges in these jurisdictions are usually appointed
from the most senior and respected members of the legal profession. They
often have decades of experience as lawyers prior to being appointed to
their position as judges. In a sense, judges in these jurisdictions are the
embodiment of the legal tradition. They have within them a sense of
"justice"-of "fairness and law"-that to a large extent these societies have
come to accept and expect, and that defines the legal system in their
jurisdictions. The judges themselves are then constrained by a curious mix
of constitutional limits on their powers, the socialization of many years in
the legal profession leading them to prestigious positions within the
profession, and the broad parameters of the common law tradition that they
must follow.
The executive branch of the government, which administers
legislation, is separated from the party in power by having no power to
legislate and by having all of its actions potentially subjected to judicial
13 A. V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th
ed. 1959). See generally RICHARD A. COSGROVE, THE RULE OF LAW: ALBERT VENN DICEY
VICTORIAN JURIST 77-87 (1980). Other twentieth century proponents are, of course,
Frederick von Hayek and Lon Fuller.
14 Mason, supra note 10, at 2.
15 For a discussion of Locke's view see J. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 143 (1936).
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review. In other words, no government agency is free to act as it chooses
without potentially having to defend its actions. When it is challenged, it
must be able to prove that it has acted within the law and has not exceeded
its legally granted power. On this neat schema, the separation of powers
works by permitting each branch of government to be controlled and
limited in its actions by the powers granted and limited by law and the other
branches of government. 16 Of course, this theory, like all theories, has its
short-comings and critiques, not the least of which is that it is a Western
concept which has by no means been received by consensus nor fully
realized in any country."
2. Further Separation in Anglo Jurisdictions: Citizens and Government
The separation among powers and parties in Anglo jurisdictions is not
limited to separation among the powers and bodies of the government. This
separation extends broadly throughout society. At least in part because of
the rebellion against the monarchy and aristocracy in England, known as
the Glorious Revolution, those not in control of the government have had a
suspicion of the government. As a result, they demanded a clear and sharp
distinction between the citizens and the government. This distinction has
served to limit the government's power and has forced the government to
act with the concerns of citizens in mind. A failure to take judicious
account of citizens' wishes has provided the basis for either a loss in the
next democratic election, or worse, a violent overthrow of the government
by another revolution. As a result of the power held by the citizens, Anglo
governments have been forced to focus more on economic development
which benefits not just the monarch and the aristocracy but a broader swath
of society including merchants, traders, and politicians. 18 While certainly
providing a broader political base for decisions under the banner of
democracy, citizen participation in the political arena has been slow to
develop, and serious concentration of government attention to the well
being of the masses has not been a hallmark for much of the time.19
Another source of power in Anglo society has been religion. The
16 Each branch limiting the other, however, makes it clear that each branch is doing more
than its singular function. See VILE, supra note 9, at 18.
17 Id. at 1.
18 A view of the broader involvement in economic concerns is evidenced by a review of
the types and classes of people who lost money in the South Sea Bubble of 1721. The Earl
of Dartmouth, for example, noted "the loss would fall chiefly on the persons of quality,"
indicating a range of investors beyond the monarchy and aristocracy who were involved in
the venture. See Julian Hoppit, The Myths of the South Sea Bubble, 12 TRANSACTIONS OF
THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOC'Y 141, 151 (2002).
19 The exception may be when Keynesian economics dominated governmental policy,
from approximately 1940-1970 in the United States and the United Kingdom.
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Church of England has had considerable power for several centuries in most
Anglo jurisdictions except the United States. 20  The deposing of the
monarchy as the sole source of political power did not translate into a
deposing of the English monarch as the head of the church. Therefore
Anglo governments have traditionally been keen to indicate their separation
from religion and the church. Anglo society has then had a tradition of
fragmenting political and religious power as well.
A stable democratic government not under threat of rebellion tends to
support economic growth and institutions that develop to protect and to
foster growth.21 The result is stable institutionalized economic systems in
Anglo jurisdictions. In societies based on economic power and rights, as
opposed to those societies developed on politico-social relations, those with
economic power reinforce those economic institutions which expand their
control and favor development that advances their power and rights.
As a result, Anglo governments have surrendered considerable control
to these particular actors which, among other things, has achieved a
stabilizing effect for their economic and political purposes. In the last
century in particular, this economic and political power has become
23
concentrated in business corporations, giving these corporations the power
to act in ways that limit democratic activity and governmental response.24
Interestingly, this shift from citizen power to corporate power has followed
the rhetoric of "citizen versus government."
Private corporate interests have come to dominate the economy,
culture and media of Anglo societies. Citizen protest around the world
against corporate power began in the 1920's and has continued to grow into
the present, as manifested in the growing opposition to economic
globalization, which often focuses on multinational corporations.25
20 PETER N. CARROLL & DAVID W. NOBLE, THE FREE AND THE UNFREE 62-63 (3d ed.
2001) (discusses and offers one explanation of the failure of the Church of England to
establish itself as a dominant part of society in the United States).
21 See generally FRANCIS FuKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
22 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).
23 This was first put forward with an empirical analysis by Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner
C. Means. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
24 See CARROLL, supra note 20. See also Benedict Sheehy, Corporations And Social
Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24(1) J.L. & COM. 1, 1-55 (2004).
25 See DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE THE WORLD (1995). On the most
recent event, the G8 Summit in Gleneagle, Scotland in July 2005, see Indymedia, G8 2005,
http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/actions/2005/g8/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2006); Sean Maguire,
Amid protests G8 meets, split on Africa and climate, http://www.tiscali.co.uk/news/
newswire.php/news/reuters/2005/07/06/topnews/amidprotestsg8meetssplitonafricaandclimat
e.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2006).
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Corporations continue to advance their economic and political interests,
dominating governmental agendas in Anglo societies and international
forums such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.26 The
dramatic rise in open and manifest pro-corporate power arose from the
failure of Keynesian economics to address stagflation of the early 1970's in
the West and a shift to neo-classical economics and monetarism.27 This
shift in economic theory buttressed a political shift toward neo-liberal
reforms which, starting with the Thatcher-Reagan era, have come to
dominate politics in the West. Generally, these reforms have permitted
governments to ignore the average citizen's concerns.28
Relevant to this discussion is the fact that these corporations have done
this often by presenting themselves as opposing government on behalf of
the citizens and claiming to protect individual rights and freedom of
choice.29  Corporations have been the main beneficiaries of freedom of
speech laws in the United States.30 This corporate take-over has been
effective by maintaining on the one hand the illusion of a separation of
corporate and government interests, 31 while on the other hand
simultaneously appearing to support a citizenry quite distinct and separate
from the government and in a position to criticize governmental policy and
action.
Thus, though there is a purported separation between citizen and
government, the reality is somewhat different. Based on voter turnout
figures for elections, the average Anglo citizen is not particularly involved
or interested in participating in the political system. Corporations, on the
other hand, are exceedingly involved in political activities as is evidenced
by such things as campaign contributions, lobbying groups, and Non-
Governmental Organizations ("NGOs") set up by corporations to advocate
26 See generally J. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 3-89, 195-213
(2001). See also MICHAEL HUDSON, SUPER IMPERIALISM: THE ORIGINS AND FUNDAMENTALS
OF U.S. WORLD DOMINANCE (2d ed. 2003).
27 STIGLITZ, supra note 26, at 13.
28 J. HACKER & P. STRAUSS, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION & THE EROSION
OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005). For some opposing views, see UNITING AMERICA:
RESTORING THE VITAL CENTRE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (N. Garfinkle & D. Yankelovich eds.,
2005).
29 For a very recent example, consider the "Center for Consumer Freedom"-a
"consumer" organization sponsored by Coca-Cola, Wendy's and Tyson Foods dedicated to
undermining government efforts to encourage healthy eating in the United States. See
generally Paul Krugman, Girth of a Nation, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at A13.
30 See Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights,
41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990).
31 See generally Michael Scherer, The Making of the Corporate Judiciary: How Big
Business is Quietly Funding a Legal Revolution, Mother Jones, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 72, 74-5,
100.
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and sell to citizens the benefits of corporate profits and activities.
Nevertheless, there remains a strong dissociation between government,
citizen and religion.
3. China: Unity of Powers-CCP, Government and Democratic
Dictatorship
The CCP's structuring of the Chinese government appears to be the
exact opposite of the Anglo structure. Whereas the Anglo model has
advocated the separation of powers, the CCP has designed a government
based on unity of powers.32 In China, the CCP, the government, and the
people's will are one-at least according to the official view. Therefore,
they exist simply as a unified whole and not merely as a collection of three
independent parties or interests forced together.33 The CCP, as part of its
effort to hold the hegemony of power, has actively promoted this unity and
opposed calls for the separation of powers.
Unlike the Soviet-styled Dictatorship of the People,34 the Chinese
model of government was a dictatorship of the workers, peasants, petty
bourgeois, and national bourgeois. 35  The Chinese government, as
established under the "Organic Law," has, as the supreme governmental
body, the Central People's Government Council. This Council has
executive, legislative, and judicial powers.36  This unity of powers
facilitated the central organization of the economy, land re-distribution,37
the numerous and marked shifts in policy, 38 and the development of state
owned enterprises that has marked China's progress in the period since
1949. China's economic, environmental, and development problems stem
largely from Mao Tse Tung who, in his twenty-seven year reign of terror
between 1949 and 1976, implemented a series of disastrous policies
concerning collectivization, the creation of famines to support his
superpower ambitions, the Cultural Revolution, and various purges. All
told, it is estimated that Mao and his CCP collaborators killed 70 million
32 RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW 83 (1994).
33 Kui HUA WANG, CHINESE COMMERCIAL LAW 16-17 (2000).
34 This is not to say that China did not follow Soviet-styled law. Indeed, it did. See id. at
10-11.
35 IMMANUEL C. Y. Hsu, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 645-47 (6th ed. 2000). Of course,
the whole story of the development of the CCP is hotly contested. Most recently, authors
Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, in a meticulously researched biography of Mao Tse-Tung,
have set out a strong case for the CCP to have been little more than a tool for Mao's
successful exploitation and manipulation of people and power to satisfy his megalomania. J.
CHANG & J. HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY (2005).
36 See Hsu, supra note 35, at 648.
" Id. at 652-57.
38 See WANG, supra note 33, at 11.
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Chinese. 39 Upon taking control of the CCP, Deng Xiaoping initiated, with
increasing speed in the 1980's-90's,40 reforms in the structure of the
economic sector permitting increased private property and liberalization in
terms of markets.4' This liberalization has had beneficial economic effects.
Indeed, Deng Xiapong argued in 1992 that this reform and liberalization
was the driving force behind China's remarkable economic growth, critical
to China's continued ascendancy.42
The ascendancy of economic power in China, however, has had
significant implications for the CCP's approach to both its own power and
its ability to control political and social development. More specifically,
with increased economic power, the CCP has had to change its view on
capitalism and the role of the economy in the development potential of
society. 43 Indeed, the 2002 revision of the CCP constitution of the 16th
Party Congress, acknowledged the existence of the following classes:
workers, peasants, members of the armed forces, intellectuals and
"advanced elements"44 of other social strata. Each of these classes is
eligible for membership in the Party.4 5 Still, to date, the CCP has managed
to maneuver through a treacherous path in order to develop a "socialist
market economy with Chinese characteristics ' 46 that marks its reform and
opening while maintaining its power. The change has been described as
"from 'politics in command' to 'economics in command. ' 'A7 In this way,
through its economic leadership, political control, and desire to reform, the
governing CCP continues its tradition of consolidating the functions of
government.
4. Further Integration: Unity of the CCP and of the People
By way of contrast, China's dictatorship has viewed itself as a
representative of the people and a democratic dictatorship born out of the
39 See CHANG, supra note 35, at 651.
40 See Hsu, supra note 35, at 776-77.
4 1 DAVID S. G. GOODMAN & GERALD SEGAL, CHINA IN THE NINETIES: CRISIS
MANAGEMENT AND BEYOND 10 (1991).
42 Wang Wei-hsin, "Teng Hsiao-p'ing lu-hsien ti kuan-ch'a" T'an So, (May 1992) 41, in
Hsu, supra note 35, at 946-7, n. 9.
43 Leong H. Liew, China's Engagement with Neo-liberalism: Path Dependency,
Geography and Party Self-Reinvention, 41 J. DEV. STUDIES 331, 340-344 (2005).
44 XIAN FA chap. 1, art. 1 (1982) (P.R.C.) [Constitution of the Communist Party of
China].
45 Art. 1(1) Compilation of Documents from the 16th National Party Congress of the
Chinese Communist Party, noted in Liew, supra note 43, at 344.
46 Created in 1993 to replace a prior CCP commitment to government dictated production
and distribution and to a state owned enterprise model.
47 See Liew, supra note 43, at 341.
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coalition of four classes of people mentioned above. This view comes not
only from the founding principles of the CCP, which have been subjected to
various revisions and reforms, but also from the complex structure of
China's government. With 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 2 special
administrative regions and 4 municipalities, all with different amounts of
power, China's government is necessarily complex.. To complicate matters
further, China also has 56 ethnic minorities and a multitude of CCP organs
and civil associations.
The CCP explains and proclaims:
The Chinese Communist Party was established on 1st July 1921. In
1949, The People's Republic of China came into being and then as the
Organizer and Leader of the Chinese Revolution, the CCP became the
ruling and controlling Party in China. Under the Constitution of the
CCP, the CCP represents the proletariat in China which is the majority
through out the country and represents the interest of most of the
Chinese people. 8
The CCP's handling of power, its view of itself, its role in governing,- and
its role in continuing reforms have, in a certain sense, mandated both its
democratic and dictatorial facets. Having to coordinate so many people of
diverse ethnicities, interests, and political arrangements, it can be argued
that the Chinese government needed to have an element of democracy
which arguably it accomplishes through elections of local party officials. "
Furthermore, the CCP viewed itself as having responsibility for advancing
the communist vision. Therefore, the CCP may claim it has necessarily
taken a dictatorial role to avoid subversion by capitalists and other less
visionary, narrowly interested parties.50 It is not surprising, therefore, that
the CCP has opposed a separation of powers.
51
The CCP's representative structures, based on combinations of class,
party membership, and civil organizations, have, in the eyes of many,
48 Translated from Chinese by Yuru Li., available at http://news3.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/
2004-11/24/ content_2255749.htm.
49 Jack Gray discusses this limited democracy but notes that local people have a choice of
candidates for election although the nominees are still determined by the party. JACK GRAY,
REBELLIONS AND REVOLUTIONS: CHINA FROM THE 1800S To 2000 434 (2d ed. 2002).
50 In Mao's various "cleansings" of the CCP, the charge of "anti-Bolshevik" as well as
"capitalist roader" could well be a condemnation to death. See CHANG, supra note 35, at 95,
558.
51 See Stanley Lubman, Studying Contemporary Chinese Law: Limits, Possibilities and
Strategy, 39 AM. J. CoMP. LAW 316, 317 (1991); RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA'S STRUGGLE FOR
THE RULE OF LAW 83 (1994). Noted also in the constitutional discussion in M. Ulric Killion,
China and Neo-liberal Constitutionalism, 3 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1, 11 (2003).
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blurred the lines between party, government, and nation. 2 Indeed, it may
hearken back to what has been described as a monolithic socio-political
tradition in which the individual's identity is subordinate and individual
interests are subsumed in the family-clan-state unity that was part of the
traditional form of governance in China 53-something that appears
enshrined in article 51 of the Constitution.54 Since the reforms of the
1990's, however, the role of ideological communism has declined
significantly as other values have moved toward center stage. Perhaps the
most notable has been individual economic values. This is not to say that
Chinese communism is dead and its agent, the CCP, is finished. Rather, it
is a reflection of a disentangling of economic and political spheres referred
to as the "self-reinvention" of the CCP and the "crumbling" of the "social
and economic foundations of communism" that leaves the political facet
intact.56
This unity is further demonstrated by the CCP's ambiguous status at
law. The CCP is identified in the Preamble of the Constitution. It reads in
part: "The system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation led
by the Communist Party of China will exist and develop in China for a long
time to come."57 It would appear that the phrase "a long time to come"
refers to the system, not the Party which one assumes would be indefinite in
its term. The term, "the system" seems to mean the CCP in the lead with
other parties straggling along. In his discussion of legal reforms in China,
Professor Albert Chen observes:
[T]he extent to which the organization, structure, functions, powers,
responsibilities and operations of the Party should come under the
purview of the law, given that it is financed by the state budget, its
personnel are paid by the state, and.., the constitutional mandate to
exercise "leadership" (the manner and procedure of which are not yet
legally defined). 8
52 This change may have started with the striking of the character for "loyalty" from the
ancestral plaques of many Chinese after Sun Yatsen. See GRAY, supra note 49, at 443.
53 Albert Chen, Toward a Legal Enlightenment: Discussion in Contemporary China on
the Rule of Law, 17 UCLA PAC. BASIN, L.J. 125, 130 nn. 26-27 (2000).
54 "The exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their freedoms and
rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society, and of the collective, or
upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens." Constitution of the Communist Party
of China, art. 51.
55 Liew, supra note 43, at 340-348.
56 HSu, supra note 35, at 950.
57 XIAN FA pmbl.
58 Chen, supra note 53, at 160. See also Hao Tiechuan, Ten Suggestions Regarding
Ruling the Country According to Law, 5 FAxuE [JURISPRUDENCE] 2 (1996).
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His comment offers an insight into a connection between party and state
that is nearly incomprehensible to citizens of multi-party Anglo
democracies. Such a unity between party and state is an important
difference between nation states, particularly when it comes to matters of
adjudication.
Interestingly, China's traditions of power had been focused on the
Emperor, who seized power on the basis of force, and had held power on
the basis of Heaven's Mandate.5 9 Religion had been a matter of family
devotion to one's ancestors and was not controlled by the state. In the
Western sense of religion, Chinese traditional religion is a syncretism of
Buddhism, Taoism, animism, and ancestor worship, none of which makes
exclusive absolutist truth claims.6 ° Perhaps this is one reason why wars in
China (with the exception of conflicts with Muslim Chinese) are not
attributed to religious conviction.
11. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW
The idea of "Law" is a highly contested notion with diverse meanings
due to individual preferences, political power structures, and eternal
ontological entities. Western and Chinese perspectives of "Law" are
radically different. Yan Fu, a leading Chinese intellectual at the beginning
of the last century, warned of this diversity in views and its importance
when he observed:
In the Chinese language, objects exist or do not exist, and this is called 1i
[order in nature, things as they are, or the law of nature.] The
prohibitions and decrees that a country has are called fa [human-made
laws]. However, Western people call both of these 'law.' Westerners
accordingly see order in nature and human made laws as if they were the
same .... The word 'law' in Western languages has four different
interpretations in Chinese as in li [order], 1i [rites, rules of propriety], fa
[human made laws] and zhi [control].
Clearly, "law" has had markedly different meanin§s in Chinese and
Western society even in a most basic, linguistic sense. This conflation of
ideas in Western language is indicative of Western ideology, just as its
discrete meanings in China reflect a different perspective. We will turn
59 See discussion of Mencius thought and critique by Xun Zi in HE ZHAOWU ET AL., AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF CHINA 57-58, 64 (He Zhaowu rev. & trans., 2d ed. 1998).6 0 ZHANG QIZHI, TRADITIONAL CHINESE CULTURE 102-132 (2004).
61 Yan Fu's translation of Montesquieu, De l'esprit de loi, quoted in DEBORAH CAO,
CHINESE LAW: A LANGUAGE PERSPECTIVE 20 (2004).
62 See Liang Zhiping, Explicating 'Law': A Comparative Perspective of Chinese and
Western Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55 (1989).
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briefly to consider these differences as they continue to inform, at least to
some degree, the on-going debate and understanding of the issues
surrounding the Rule of Law and its role in commercial disputes.
A. The West: A Metaphysical First Principle
Traditionally, law in Western society is part of the eternal nature of the
universe as organized by the divine. This view is succinctly expressed by
Roman statesman, Cicero, circa 50 B.C.:
[Law] is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting... it is a
sin to try to alter this law, nor is it allowable to attempt to repeal any
part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely .... There will not be
different law as at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the
future, but one eternal and unchanging law will be valid for all nations
and all times.
63
This exalted view of law was carried forward from the early Roman Empire
of Cicero's day via the Roman Catholic Church. It was revived and
systematized through the thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas. This view of
law as part of the natural order, for Western thinkers at least, caused it to be
viewed as falling into the domain of religion. 64 God, who for the West is an
anthropomorphic being, caused the heavens and earth to exist, as well as all
laws and order. The Christian religion, therefore, was intrinsically linked to
the law. This connection between law and institutional religion caused
them to fuse, mixing both the charitable dimensions and the hierarchical
tendencies of religion to inform law.
Although this natural law view is a traditional view and has fallen out
of favor in the West, for many modem Western theorists, 65 including
H.L.A. Hart66 and Lon Fuller,67 it still carries at least a kernel of truth. It
has a special appeal to Westerners because it offers some relief to the
indeterminacies of social existence; because of law's universal, timeless
nature, law has been viewed with reverence in the West and its practitioners
given a high level of respect. Law is viewed as a dispassionate meting out
of justice, a fair means to resolving disputes in an honorable and just way.
63 CICERO DE RE PUBLICA, III at 22.
64 Wang claims that there is also a tradition of connecting religion and law in the "Five
Penalties" of the Shang Dynasty of ancient China. See WANG, supra note 33, at 5.
65 Larry Arnhary, Thomistic Natural Law as Darwinian Natural Right, in NATURAL LAW
AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (E. Frankel Paul. et. al, eds., 2001); Joseph Boyle,
Fairness in Holdings: A Natural Law Account of Property and Welfare Rights, in NATURAL
LAW AND MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 206 (E. Frankel Paul. et. al, eds., 2001).
66 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Are there Any Natural Rights?, 64 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REV.
175 (1955)
67 LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 186 (rev. ed. 1969).
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Through its multitude of changes, law has at some level always (at least
generally) resonated in the West as a form of relief, social ordering, and a
manifestation of justice and certainty in a world that seems otherwise to be
crowded with intractable injustices and indeterminate solutions.68
B. The East: An Instrument of Control and a Last Resort When Shame and
Respect Fail
By way of contrast, law has generally not had the same prestige in
China. Indeed, since the brief Ch'in Dynasty of 221-207 B.C. and the
69 70Legalist School,69 in which a strict, harsh legal regime was introduced and
enforced, law (fa) has had a rather poor reputation.7' Although there is a
natural law theme in the Mandate of Heaven, or Will of Heaven discussions
of that same period,72 law has been viewed as merely an instrument used by
the rulers to impose their will on the, people leading to the general
acceptance of an instrumentalist view of law referred to as "rule by law."
73
Law, when seen as a list of rules for meting out punishments and guiding
government action, has contributed to its being seen as a last resort. This
negative view of law in the Chinese tradition existed from the period of the
Ch'in Dynasty until 191 1,75 and the subsequent instrumentalist view of law,
currently referred to as "pragmatic," continues into the present.76 Law has
no high position, existentially and to itself in China. Indeed, it is said that
"the CCP can rewrite the law whenever it deems it to be appropriate and
convenient, with or without the consent of the people. 77
Chinese folk sayings about law, which in some ways reflect the
collected wisdom of a people, are illustrative of this negative, skeptical
view of law. Consider the following: "Better to be vexed to death than
68 Of course, in considering the legal subject as a creation of social discourse, one arrives
at the rather different views of the role of law in Western discourse. Robert Gordon, for
example, argues that law is "omnipresent in the very marrow of society," and provides some
of "the primary sources of pictures of order and disorder, virtue and vice, reasonableness and
craziness." Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 109 (1984).
69 ZHAOWU, supra note 59, at 72-85.
70 Id. at 80.
71 GLENN, supra note 3, at 305-306.
72 QIZHI, supra note 60, at 40-42.
73 D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA: EXEMPLIFIED BY 190 CH'IN DYNASTY
CASES 11 (1967).
74 GLENN, supra note 3, at 333.
7 Id. at 306.
76 See Yu Xingzhong, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE
LAW 24 (1989); P. POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL
CULTuRE 10 (2001).
77 WANG, supra note 33, at 17.
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bring a lawsuit,"78 and "litigation ultimately ends in disaster., 79 Confucius
said "In hearing lawsuits, I am no better than anyone else. What we need is
to have no lawsuits." 80 In essence, resolution of disputes was to be brought
about by any means other than law (fa).
The Chinese tradition, however, has not been limited to viewing law as
a list of rules for punishment. 8' Indeed, pluralism seems to be a constant of
Chinese tradition.82  Law (one translation of "li") has generally had a
different, more intuitive sense or meaning. Consider, for example, the
contrast between law (fa) and law (li) in the view of Confucius:
The Master said, 'If the people be led by laws [fa], and uniformity
sought to be given them by punishments, they will try to avoid the
punishment, but have no sense of shame. If they be led by virtue [li],
and uniformity sought to be given them by the rules of propriety, they
will have the sense of shame, and moreover will become good. 83
The Confucian tradition sets up a more amorphous, fluid notion of law.
It is not one thing but an attitude or disposition, a question of propriety. As
the quote indicates, law (fa) cannot create an acceptable social order."4 For
that order to occur something else is required and in China that something
else is the Confucian li. Li has been variously defined as "moral law,"
"customary uncodified law, internalized by individuals, 86 "the concrete
institutions and the accepted modes of behavior in a civilized state," 87
"moral and social rules of conduct," 88 and "courtesy, customs and traditions
78 GLENN, supra note 3, at 308. It is interesting to note a remarkably similar statement by
former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Learned Hand: "As a litigant, I should dread a lawsuit
beyond almost anything short of sickness and death." See Learned Hand, Deficiencies of
Trial to Reach the Truth of the Matter, in LECTURES ON LEGAL ToPics 89, 105 (1921-22)
(James N. Rosenburg et al. eds., 1926) cited in Ruskola, supra note 5, at 211.
79 GLENN, supra note 3, at 308.
80 Confucius, Analects 12:13. Charles Muller trans., Thy6 Gakuen University, available
at http://www.hm.tyg.jp/-acmuller/contao/analects.html.
81 This view of Chinese law is advanced by some Western commentators. See the
critique offered in T. Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparatives
Law and Development Theory in Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1599, 1618 (2000).
82 GLENN, supra note 3, at 325.
83 Confucius, supra note 80, at 1:1.
84 GLENN, supra note 3, at 326.
85 D. Tan, Judicial Independence in the People's Republic of China: Myth or Reality, 68
AuST. L.J. 660, 663 (1994).
86 j. Ching, Human Rights: A Valid Chinese Concept? in W. DE BARY AND Tu WEIMING,
CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 67,74 (1998).
87 BODDE, supra note 73, at 19.
88 A. CHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEM OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 8 (1992).
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we come to share." 
89
Li is fundamentally a relational concept, flexible, consensual, harmony
focused and viewed as a "mutual reinforcement of norms rather than a
dispute over content." 90  This voluntary, as opposed to coercive, social
ordering was seen as highly preferable, civilized, acceptable, and refined.
The harsh intrusion of the blunt instrument of law into a refined social order
was therefore seen as reprehensible. Keeping in mind that the following
extract is to teach Confucian social ordering, the contradistinction between
law and correct social relations and the preference for li is illustrated by this
sharp story:
The Duke of She informed Confucius, saying 'Among us here there are
those who may be styled upright in their conduct. If their father has
stolen a sheep, they will bear witness to the fact.' Confucius said,
'Among us, in our part of the country.... The father conceals the
misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the
father. Uprightness is to be found in this.'
91
This connection of rightness with relationships rather than compliance with
imposed rules, of harmony of social relations over conformity to
abstractions and codes, sits at the heart of the Chinese tradition's approach
to law. Glenn writes: "We have to think of law as li, a learned,... informal
tradition of normativity, whose persuasiveness was so great that it could
effectively control all those areas of life which were not given over to the
formal world of fa-edicted sanction. 92 Professor Cao explains this by her
observation that "[i]n any conflict between li and fa, traditional Chinese
society preferred li."'93 Li denies the normative value of formal law and
formal sanction over informal, relationally-based ordering, 94 and may in
part form some of the basis for one of the common Western views in which
China is seen as "lawless." 95
One can see the notion of guidance and control in society, which the
West ascribes to law, from a rather different perspective in China in the
following story from The Analects:
The Master said, 'T'ai-po may be said to have reached the highest point
89 H. Rosemont, Jr., Why Take Human Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD'S RELIGIONS 167 (L. Rouner ed., 1988).
90 GLENN, supra note 3, at 311.
91 Confucian Analects (James Legge trans. 1893) in THE CHINESE CLASSICS, VOL. 1:
CONFUCIAN ANALECTS, THE GREAT LEARNING AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN 270 (1970).
92 GLENN, supra note 3, at 310.
93 CAO, supra note 61, at 63.
94 GLENN, supra note 3, at 304-305.
95 Noted, explained and critiqued in Ruskola, supra note 5, at 183.
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of virtuous action. Thrice he declined the kingdom, and the people in
ignorance of his motives could not express their approbation of his
conduct.' The Master said, 'Respectfulness, without the rules of
propriety, becomes laborious bustle; carefulness, without the rules of
propriety, becomes timidity; boldness, without the rules of propriety,
becomes insubordination; straightforwardness, without the rules of
propriety, becomes rudeness.' 'When those who are in high stations
perform well all their duties to their relations, the people are aroused to
virtue. When old friends are not neglected by them, the people are
preserved from meanness.'
96
This story indicates the value of wisdom and propriety over some perceived
control by law. The rejection of the kingdom is an indication of the value
of wisdom above material wealth and the value of disengagement from the
entanglements of politics. The Confucian adage of virtue above all as the
guiding force is abundantly clear in the story of the rejection of the
kingdom and the explication which follows it.
Ultimately, the Chinese view of what Westerners call law is
pragmatic.97 Law is valued as a means to accomplish some one or other
particular end not as a value in itself contributing to the social order. It has
no exalted existential status and is merely one among many cultural
artifacts, and one of lesser importance at that. 98 It is a source of discord in a
society that values harmony. As such, traditional China discouraged self-
interested litigation and promoted compromise and concession."
Certainly, there have been dramatic changes in China and Chinese
traditional views toward law in the last century. At one point in his reign,
Mao advanced that people who wish to appeal to the law courts were asking
for more punishment.' 0  Changes introduced by the CCP were enormous to
say the least, and indeed have left China's laws and legal system with very
little in common with pre-1911 law.101 This dramatic reorientation with
respect to law can be illustrated by comparing the ancient Taoist saying "the
more laws are promulgated, the greater the number of thieves," with Deng
Xiapong's comment that "law is better than no law, faster [law making] is
96 Confucius, supra note 80, at 2:8.
97 See WANG, supra note 36, at 39; KEITH, supra note 32, at 1; and Preston Torbert,
China's Struggle for the Rule of Law, by Ronald C. Keith, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 639, 642
(1995).
98 This lesser regard for law may be a result of the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties of the
Slave Period. See WANG, supra note 33, at 2. It is a central theme in Western critiques of
Chinese law. See Ruskola, supra note 5.
99 Chen, supra note 53, at 129-130.
100 CHANG, supra note 35.
101 WANG, supra note 33, at 1.
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better than slower [law making]. 10 2 Still, these changes notwithstanding,
certain elements of the traditions survived intact-including a low regard
for lawl03-and with considerable strength.
Neither Western ideologies, whether Marxism10 4 or neo-liberalism, 10 5
nor China's own ideologies, such as Mao's own ideology and the Cultural
Revolution aimed at the destruction of Chinese traditional culture,'0 6 has yet
to destroy the bases forming the foundations of Chinese culture. Modern
discourse about law in China includes a discussion of a revival of
Confucian thinking. 0 7 Despite on-going skepticism about the efficacy of
law in China, there has been a concerted effort by the CCP to encourage
reliance on it, illustrated by its promotion of litigation.10 8
C. Summary: The Traditional Role of Law in Societies of the East and West
These historical allusions are important to contemporary discussion
because the issues faced by the Ancients are the same issues we face
today'0 9 and their answers, perhaps not surprisingly, are remarkably similar
to those of leading modern theorists. Furthermore, kernels of their ancient
answers survive in the often unspoken ethos of a society known as
culture. 110 Culture, as a form of thinking about the world, is not something
merely manufactured and imposed on a people. As leading cultural theorist
Edward Hall observed, "The purpose of the model [i.e., culture] is to enable
the user to do a better job in handling the enormous complexity of life. By
using models, we see and test how things work and can even predict how
things will go in the future.""' Culture is something developed over
centuries and millennia.
102 Quoted in KEITH, supra note 32, at 20, and noted as an example of the CCP's
pragmatic view of law in WANG, supra note 33, at 39.
103 WANG, supra note 33, at 37.
104 GLENN, supra note 3, at 332.
105 Killion, supra note 5 1.
106 As early as 1917, a Mao friend and contemporary wrote of Mao's desire for a
"burning all the collections of prose and poetry after the Tang and Sung dynasties in one
go." Quoted in CHANG & HALLIDAY, supra note 35, at 12.
107 See W. DE BARY, THE TROUBLE WITH CONFUCIANISM 45 (1991); CHEN, supra note 88,
at 48; Benjamin Gregg Law in China: The Tug of Tradition, the Push of Capitalism, 21 REv.
OF CENT. AND E. EUR. L. 65, 76 (1995); GLENN, supra note 3, at 333.108 WANG, supra note 33, at 38 (citing Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights
in the PRC: Impediments to Protection and the Need for Rule of Laws, 15 UCLA PACIFIC
BASIN L.J. 1, 40 (1996)).
109 GRAY, supra note 49, at 458.
110 Yu Xingzhong, Legal Pragmatism in the People's Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L.
29, 32 (1989) ("Traditional notions at the heart of ancient Chinese law.., remain influential
today.")
1 1EDWARD T. HALL, BEYOND CULTURE 13 (1976).
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To the extent that one may generalize about the different views,
Professor Cao's observation is insightful. She observes:
Westerners may be more willing to accept a narrowly circumscribed
rule of law that sacrifices equity and particularised justice for the virtues
of generality, equality, impartiality and certainty that result from
limiting the discretion of the decision-maker. In contrast, Chinese
ethical traditions whether Confucian, Daoist or Maoist, have rejected
rule ethics and universal principles in favour of a context-specific,
pragmatic and situational ethics."'
Regardless of the dramatic changes in technology in recent centuries,
human nature, human culture and human law retain strong elements of
continuity that persist in informing humans about how to live, what is right
and what is wrong. In summary, the West has come to see the law as the
divinely granted method of ordering society, part of the natural order of the
universe, integral to the universal order. In China, there is no such role for
law: 113 it is merely a smaller part of society and a last resort in resolving
disputes that threaten the harmonious fabric of society.'1 4 Westerners have
accepted a model of humanity based on economic and legal rights and a
societal ordering based on persons with economic power enforcing those
rights. The Chinese have determined their society based on their
relationships and networks, reflecting family loyalties and political
influence.
With this background setting out the distinct versions and views of
social control and the role of law in Chinese and Western societies, it is
appropriate to turn to considering specific legal notions in both contexts.
IV. THE RULE OF LAW
The notion of the Rule of Law is central to the function of Western
liberal states.1 15 It guides governments in their strategy, legislation, and
112 Deborah Cao, Fazhi vs/and/or Rule of Law?: A Semiotic Venture into Chinese Law,
INT'L J. SEMOTIcs L. 223, 240 (2001) (citing Perry Keller, Sources of Order in Chinese Law,
42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (1994)); see Randall P. Peerenboom, Ruling the Country in
Accordance with Law: Reflections in the Rule and Role of Law in Contemporary China, 11
CULTURAL DYNAMIcs 315 (1999).
113 This smaller role accorded to law in China may be in part due to some Western
commentators' failure to accept Chinese law as law. See, e.g., JOHN KING FAIRBANK, CHINA:
A NEW HISTORY 185-86 (1992); Ruskola, supra note 5, at 179.
114 GLENN, supra note 3, at 309.
115 Cheryl Saunders & Katherine Le Roy, Perspectives on the Rule of Law, in THE RULE
OF LAW 1 (Cheryl Saunders & Katherine Le Roy eds., 2003). Professor Tomasic observed
that the Rule of Law serves to legitimize the legal system in the West. Roman Tomasic,
Company Law and the Limits of the Rule of Law in China, 4 AUSTL. J. CORP. L. 471, 476
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operation, and guides people in the evaluation of government action. When
governments fail to follow the Rule of Law, they can expect either removal
from power by accepted political processes or removal by revolt., 16 China,
however, has a very different view of the Rule of Law." 7  The only
reference to the Rule of Law is in article 5 of the Constitution, which reads:
Article 5 [Socialist Legal System, Rule of Law]
1. The People's Republic of China practices ruling the country in
accordance with the law and building a socialist country of law.
2. The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal
system.
3. No law or administrative or local rules and regulations shall
contravene the Constitution.
4. All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public
organizations, and all enterprises and undertakings must abide by the
Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of the Constitution
and the law must be looked into.
5. No organization or individual ma% enjoy the privilege of being
above the Constitution and the law.
l 8
This article, as it stands, is the result of a constitutional amendment
introduced at the second plenary session of the Ninth National People's
Congress in March 1999.8 9 Is China, because of this one change in the
Constitution, a Rule of Law state? 120  There are two main challenges to
defining China as a Rule of Law state. First, some Western commentators
deny that China, as a socialist state, can qualify as a Rule of Law state
which, by definition, is limited to liberal democracies.12 ' Their definition of
the Rule of Law is a thick, or formal, definition. In this definition of the
(1995).
116 The notion of government legitimacy depending upon the people's wishes is the
notion of the Social Contract. See generally THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORISTS: CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON HOBBES, LOCKE AND ROUSSEAU (Christopher W. Morris ed., 1999).
117 See Karen Turner, Rule of Law Ideals in Early China, 6 J. CHINESE L. 44 (1992)
(offers an excellent historical review).
118 XIAN FA, art. 5, §§ 1-5 (1982) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/
icl/ch00000.html.
119 Chen, supra note 53, at 128.
120 The obvious assumption is that Australia itself is a Rule of Law state. Both historic
and recent events, including Australia's policy toward Aboriginal peoples, support of the
United States' illegal invasion of Iraq (the May 22, 2003 U.N. resolution did not deal with
the attack's legality), and refusal to investigate U.S. abuse of Australian citizen Habib in
Guantanamo and U.S. incarceration of detainees without recourse to the courts, offer
reasonable grounds for suggesting Australia is not a Rule of Law state.
121 Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 127, 135
(1993); see also WANG, supra note 33, at 16-18.
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Rule of Law, basic legal principles do not suffice. The Rule of Law has
substantive elements that include economic arrangements (such as free
market capitalist or socialist), governmental arrangements (such as
dictatorships or democracies), and notions of human rights (such as liberal
or communitarian).122 Since the modem rise of the Rule of Law occurred in
liberal democracies, there is a tendency to equate the Rule of Law with that
form of social organization. 1
23
The second set of challenges to China as a Rule of Law state is based
on the following lack of separation of powers: because the Supreme
People's Court is answerable to the National People's Congress and its
Standing Committee, just as the local courts are answerable to the local
committees, the court is not independent of political influence. Further, as
the Standing Committee is the final arbiter of legal interpretation, the
judicial, political and legislative arms of the government are not separate.
Challengers argue that without these separations, there can be no Rule of
Law. 1
24
Professor Peerenboom, a scholar who has written considerably on the
Rule of Law, offers that, "[a]t its most basic [level], rule of law refers to a
system in which law is able to impose meaningful restraints on the state and
individual members of the ruling elite... [through] a government of laws,
the supremacy of the law and equality of all before the law.' ' 125
Peerenboom, following Raz, 126 has described two views of the Rule of
Law, 127 "thick" and "thin," which parallel Raz's "informal" and "formal"
categories. A "thin" view permits further discussion because it has but
minimal content. Peerenboom offers the following as constitutive of a thin
conception of the Rule of Law:
128
" Meaningful restraints on state actors and ruling elites
* Rules for empowering certain authorities to make law
" Laws are made only according to those rules
" Laws are publicized and accessible
122 RANDALL P. PEERENBOOM, ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 4
(Randall P. Peerenboom ed., 2004); see generally David Kairys, Searching for the Rule of
Law, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 307 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=724341
(accessible and critical introduction to the topic).
123 Id.
124 WANG, supra note 33, at 16.
125 PEERENBOOM, supra note 122, at 2.
126 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210-29
(1979).
127 PEERENBOOM, supra note 122, at 2-10.
128 Id. at 2-3.
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" Laws be generally applicable and not focused on individuals
" Laws must be clear, consistent, stable, prospective
* Laws must be enforced
" Laws must be reasonably acceptable and accepted by the majority 129
It is immediately evident that this list is completely lacking in normative
content. 130 In other words, it only informs about how law is organized,
managed and conducted in a particular state. It says nothing about what
social objectives the law aims to achieve or political agenda the law aims to
advance. China's purported adoption of the Rule of Law is a distinct
change in policy, leaving behind a more instrumentalist, pragmatic, or
socialist view of law. 1.31  Still, China's version of the Rule of Law is
markedly different from Anglo versions. The difference becomes apparent
when examining the thick version of the Rule of Law in Western and
Chinese systems, to which we now turn.
A. Western Liberal Societies
As previously noted, law holds a particularly privileged place in
Western society and thinking. This change was particularly significant
when the Roman Catholic Church lost its power over increasingly
significant parts of the population. Western society, stripped of its guiding
religion by the scientific discoveries flowing from the Enlightenment and
the Protestant Reformation, looked to other forms of social organization and
authority. Western society soon rejected the traditional authority of
monarchies and sought out new forms of social order. Law, particularly
well situated at the time, filled the void and provided a means of social
organization. 132  Having rejected other forms of rule, including
authoritarian, monarchical, and terror, the notion of rule by impartial law
was a pleasing ideal.
The Rule of Law is comprised of four main principles in common law
jurisdictions. As stated by Saunders and Le Roy:
[T]he polity must be governed by general rules that are laid down in
advance... [, and] these rules (and no other rules) must be applied and
enforced .... [D]isputes about rules must be resolved effectively and
129 id.
130 Fuller, supra note 67, at 39.
131 Whether China is moving toward the Rule of Law in fact is controversial. With
respect to the trial of the three leaders of the China Democracy Party, historian Gray notes,
"[N]ew laws and procedures remained subject to the Party's self-proclaimed right to
intervene and overrule the law in the last resort." GRAY, supra note 49, at 437.
132 This functionalist view is only but one of many competing and at least partially
satisfying answers to the problem of law in society.
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fairly .... [G]ovemment itself is bound by the same rules as citizens[,]
and... disputes involving governments are resolved in the same way as
those involving private parties. 1
33
Troper observes that, "[i]n the language of modem politics the expression
'rule of law', together with 'democracy' and possibly 'market economy',
has become the symbol of what is good and just.' ' 134 Although Troper goes
on to question this equation of views, his statement of the popular view is
nevertheless helpful. In the West, it is undoubtedly the case that these
notions converge, purportedly justifying and explaining one another.
As democratic states, the West has had Rule of Law institutionalized
for decades, if not centuries. Democracy has three dimensions: an electoral
dimension where universal suffrage is exercised to select policy, a
participatory process, which includes free speech permitting candidates to
freely express views and citizens to participate in policy development, and
finally, institutions to ensure that these processes are carried out fairly-the
Rule of Law dimension. Thus, although democracy needs the Rule of Law,
the Rule of Law is not dependent on democracy. 135
Still, perhaps in part because of this conflation and perceived
superiority, the Western perspective on the Rule of Law often carries a
missionary element. 136 In the context of the West's interaction with China,
it is an attempt to bring China to an "enlightened"' 137 (i.e. "they" have come
to see it "our" way) state at best, or to transform China into yet another state
that has committed itself to a neo-liberal ideology where the rich over-run
everyone else without restrictions. 138 Indeed, Asian countries such as China
and Vietnam view this less than covert attempt to convert as a repugnant
form of imperialism, which is a source of conflict between those countries
and such U.S.-dominated bodies as the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund ("IMF"), and WTO. 139
In summary, although some often conflate Rule of Law with liberal
democracies and market economies, the West accepts that the Rule of Law
133 Saunders, supra note 115, at 5; Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Rule of Law and
Governance in the East Asian State, 1 AsIAN L. 107 (1999) (claiming that Hong Kong is
governed by the Rule of Law).
134 Michel Troper, The Limits of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 81 (Cheryl
Saunders & Katherine Le Roy eds., 2003).
135 PEERENBOOM, supra note 122, at xix.
136 Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? Problems and
Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored 'Rule of Law' Reform Projects in the People's Republic of
China, 18 UCLA PAC. BAsiN L.J. 64 (2000); PEERENBOOM, supra note 122, at xvi.
137 Chen, supra note 53, at 165 (the Rule of Law debate in China is "an attempt to foster
a new Chinese political culture that is liberal, constitutional and democratic.")
138 Ruskola, supra note 5, at 228.
139 PEERENBOOM, supra note 122, at 38.
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is a control on government action, placing limits on both government-
citizen actions and citizen-citizen activities.
B. Fazhi-A Similar Concept in China?
'Rule of Law' is a contested term in China. It has been conflated with
other terms, such as the Rule by Law of the Legalist period of the Quing
Dynasty 221-207 B.C. 140 (known as yifa zhiguo orfazhi),14 1 Rule by Men
(known as renzhi), and more recently with the Legal System (known as
fazhi, though it is different in meaning thanfazhi described above).1 42 In
modem times, it carried with it a derogatory connotation as part of the
Marxist critique of capitalism. 43  Although the 1950's Anti-Rightist
movement rejected Rule of Law as "bourgeois,"'' 44 the CCP itself
resurrected it with a positive meaning in 1978.1
45
As evident in the earlier section dealing with the tradition of law in
China, a narrowly prescribed regime of punitive rules and punishments
cannot produce a core suitable for social organization. Accordingly, Rule
of Law as understood in the West has no history in China.146 To say this is
not to say that China has not had its own experiences with rulers using law
in some aspect of their rule. Rather, it is to say that given law's
traditionally narrow scope and China's traditional hierarchical social
ordering, there has been little need for the development of the concept as
understood in the West. As Professor Chen's state of the art review of the
discussion of Rule of Law in China shows, the debate has been exceedingly
diverse and grown at an explosive rate. 147 Some Chinese scholars in this
active and diverse group have taken up, discussed, critiqued, advocated, or
rejected every conceivable facet of the Rule of Law, both thick and thin.
Although the mere inclusion of the Rule of Law in the constitution
does not make China a Rule of Law state, its inclusion is evidence of the
legitimacy of the notion in contemporary China. 148 Indeed, scholars see a
movement towards the Rule of Law, which, barring some intermediate
event turning the whole project around, may well be the future of China's
legal system. 49 What the Rule of Law means in the Constitution is not
140 Chen, supra note 53, at 129.
141 WANG, supra note 33, at 40.
142 Cao, supra note 112, at 234-36 (masterful discussion of the concepts and language).
143 Id. at 235.
144 Chen, supra note 53, at 125-26.
145 Torbert, supra note 97, at 641.
146 Some scholars, as discussed in Chen's review, contest this view. Chen, supra note 53.
147 Id. at 125.
148 Cao, supra note 112, at 244.
149 id.; Chen, supra note 53, at 165.
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clear. Indeed, there is an argument that it is merely another way of stating
rule by law-i.e., rule by the whim of the CCP through its law-making150
powers.
Perhaps the best concise explanation of the Rule of Law [fazhi] in
China is Professor Cao's, who writes:
Fazhi consists of two Chinese characters, fa (law or laws) and zhi (to
rule or govem, or rule or governing). Without going into a discussion of
fa, essentially, fa denotes a meaning of 'fair', 'straight' and 'just,'
derived from its water radical in the Chinese character. It also carries
the sense of 'standard, measurement, and model.' 151
Some view the Rule of Law as particularly important in China's transition
to a Socialist Market Economy. Former Chinese President Jiang Zemin
stated that, "ruling the country according to law is an important mark of
social progress and the civilization of a society; it is a necessary
requirement of our construction of a modem socialist state."' 152  The
necessity of strong private property rights and contract law is
uncontroversial in any market economy and hence they form an important
part of the discussion and reform in Chinese law as it pertains to its socialist
market economy.153
For China to make the shift to a thin Rule of Law state, not only does
there need to be considerable theorizing about what the Rule of Law will
mean in a socialist state,' 54 but also there will have to be significant
innovations in thinking, language, 155 law, and legal institutions. 156 Some of
these innovations have begun. For example, changes resulting from the
1996 Lawyers Law permitted lawyers to act in the interests of their clients
rather than the interests of the state. 157 Judicial independence has increased
as well in that political influence in individual decisions has decreased-
150 WANG, supra note 33, at 17.
151 Cao, supra note 112, at 234 (citing Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law": A
Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55 (1989)
(for a "discussion of the Chinese characterfa in comparison to the English 'law')).
152 Chen, supra note 53, at 127.
153 WANG, supra note 33, at 41-42; Albert Hung-yee Chen, The Developing Theory of
Law and Market Economy in Contemporary China, in LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA:
MARKET ECONOMY AND LAW 3 (Wang Guiguo & Wei Zhenying eds., 1996).
154 See Randall P. Peerenboom, Competing Conception of Rule of Law in China, in
ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RULE OF LAW
IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 113-145 (Randall P. Peerenboom ed.,
2004).
155 For example, the term "liberal" implies "irresponsible" in Chinese. GRAY, supra note
49, at 458.
156 WANG, supra note 33, at 40.
1" Id. at 18.
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although general judicial policy is still controlled by the CCP. 58 Many
challenges to China's legal system were presented by its accession to the
WTO and in particular were identified as Rule of Law-type problems by
Cao Jainming, the Vice-President of the Supreme People's Court of the
PRC.159 In his extensive review of the changes that need to be implemented
pursuant to the Rule of Law required by the accession, it is interesting to
note that at no point did he suggest that the CCP be checked in the exercise
of its power. It may well be that as others have said,160 the biggest challenge
to the Rule of Law will be the matter of the relationship of the CCP to the
law and its officials. Will it and its officials be subject to the law? 61 To
make this transition, the CCP will be forced to give up some of its power
and authority.
Of course, there will be problems with many aspects of this shift and it
is important to note that this discussion is not the first discussion of the
Rule of Law in the CCP. Indeed, Mao had considered writing a
Constitution and apparently produced some drafts; however, in an apparent
rejection of any limitations on his power, decided against the effort. In
1956, Mao permitted his number two, Liu Shao-chi, to discuss setting up a
legal system in which the CCP was to "convince everyone ... that as long
as he does not violate the law, citizen's rights are guaranteed and he will not
be violated." 63 In addition, there were calls for an independent judiciary
and an amendment of duty so that one who "follows the law, not the orders
of the Party" is not persecuted.' 64 These ideas flourished under the One
Hundred Flowers movement, which Mao subsequently violently
suppressed, purging members of the CCP and others, leading to about
550,000 being labelled "rightists" with its bitter consequences.1
65
Whatever else one may say about the Rule of Law in China, there is
currently a growing push for it, and it appears that there is a consensus
developing in which China's development toward the Rule of Law will be a
Rule of Law within the thin or formal model discussed above.
166
158 Id.
159 Cao Jainming, WTO and the Rule of Law in China, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 379
(2002).
160 Chen, supra note 53, at 160 (notes this to be a forbidden topic).
161 WANG, supra note 33, at 40.
162 CHANG, supra note 35, at 407.
163 Id. at 420 (citing Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuabian (Important Documents of
P.R.C.), 9 CCP Archive Study Office, 92-94, 268-69).
164 CHANG, supra note 35, at 436.
165 Id. at 437.
166 Drawn generally from the broad discussion in Chen's article and his comment of a
consensus of the desirability of the Rule of Law among Chinese legal scholars. Chen, supra
note 53, at 138. See also Cao, supra note 112, at 246-47.
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C. Summary of the Rule of Law in Societies of the East and West
The Rule of Law is a difficult concept which imports for many a
considerable number of additional political ideas. In its most stripped-down
form, the Rule of Law is a thin, or formal, standard for measuring
government behaviour. Both China and the West have traditions of the
Rule of Law, although they are markedly different. In the West, the
tradition is viewed as a harmonious, linear progress leading to a form of
control on government action and a means of protecting citizens from
unwarranted intrusion and, in fact, determining what is warranted and
unwarranted.
The Eastern tradition is more complex. In China, the notion of the
Rule of Law has moved unpredictably depending on the particular views of
the ruling classes. Even in the last century, the Chinese view has veered
wildly from one extreme to the other, from Mao's repudiation of essentially
all law to the recent revival and active engagement in discussion of all
facets of the dialogue concerning Rule of Law.
Perhaps the most significant difference is the depth of penetration of
the view of Rule of Law. As Professor Martin Krygier observes:
For the rule of law to count, rather than simply to be announced or
decreed, people must care about what the law says-the rules
themselves must be taken seriously, and the institutions must come to
matter. They must enter into the psychological economy of everyday
life-to bear both on calculations of the likely official responses and on
those many circumstances in which one's actions are very unlikely to
come to any officials' attention at all. They must mesh with, rather than
contradict or be irrelevant to the 'intuitive law' [sic]. .. in terms of
which people think about and organize their everyday lives.
167
Krygier sees this integration of the rule of law into people's everyday
thinking as a fortunate phenomenon in Anglo-American societies. It allows
such societies to function despite not having unities of culture, ethnicity or
language. In this sense, rule of law has become an important organizing
principle in Anglo-American societies; however, in China it has not.
V. RESOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL DISPUTES
Social interaction leads to dispute. Whether as a result of poor
understanding, changing circumstances, strategic behaviour or outright
maliciousness, conflicts are a normal and possibly necessary part of human
167 M. Krygier, The Grammar of Colonial Legality: Subjects, Objects and the Australian
Rule of Law, in AUSTRALIA RESHAPED: 200 YEARS OF INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION 220
(Geoffrey Brennan & Francis Castles eds., 2002), reprinted in M. KRYGIER, Subjects,
Objects, and the Colonial Rule of Law, in CIVIL PASSIONS: SELECTED ESSAYS 80 (2005).
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society. Business is no exception.
A. The Western Approach to Commercial Dispute Resolution
The Western model of business has been competitive at least since the
sixteenth century and subsequently increased with the privatization of the
Commons in the eighteenth century and the industrial revolution thereafter.
Prior to that, production and distribution were coordinated as in any feudal
society based on matters of religion, location in the hierarchy, and where
markets were used and goods traded, pricing was based on a notion of
fairness rather than the maximum profit obtainable. 168 The clan system and
the limited movement of members of Western society restricted the ability
of one member to take advantage of another member of society.
Once the traditional forms of social control broke down, resulting from
the revolutions in England and France and the European invasions of new
continents where the social order from homelands rapidly faded,169 it was
necessary for Westerners to develop new and different forms of enforcing
agreements. The method that came to be accepted in Western countries was
law and rights talk.
170
B. The Chinese Approach to Commercial Dispute Resolution
By way of contrast, the model of business in China is significantly
different from the model in Western countries. This difference is reflected
in contract drafting 171 and business negotiations in general. 172  Indeed,
significant contracts are entered into with terms which would make a
Western commercial lawyer shudder. Consider the following example:
Where one party to a contract fails to perform the contract obligations or
its performance fails to satisfy the terms of the contract, the party shall
bear such liabilities for breach of contract as to continue to perform its
obligations, to take remedial measures, or to compensate for losses,
etc. I 3
Such ambiguity would not only be prima facie evidence of professional
168 See LINDA MCQUAIG, ALL You CAN EAT: GREED, LUST AND THE NEW CAPITALISM
(2002).
169 See CARROLL, supra note 20, at 72-75 (a discussion of this phenomenon in the United
States).
170 See Ruskola, supra note 5, at 200-02.
171 See, e.g., DEBORAH CAO, Chinese Law and Imprecise Language, in CAO, supra note
61, at 103. See also, Yu, supra note 2, at 40-43.
172 See ROBERT MORAN & WILLIAM STRIPP, DYNAMICS OF SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS (1991).
173 CAO, supra note 61, at 103.
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negligence, it is even hard to imagine what a lawyer would have in mind
drafting, let alone accepting, such loose terms! Yet it is language from an
actual contract. Noted Chinese law scholar Professor Albert Chen claims
that there is an absence of commercial law in China.
74
This difficulty is in one sense not surprising; rather it is consistent with
Chinese social values and customs. Chinese traditionally limit trust to well-
known groups of family and friends, with none at all to strangers. There is
no sense of loyalty to society-only to filial relations (hsiao) and to the
emperor (chung), leading to what has been referred to as "negative
expectations about cooperation in Chinese society.' 75 In other words, the
family receives complete trust, the friend considers trust based on mutual
dependence and face, and the stranger has no assumption of trust, described
as indifference on the verge of callousness. 176 In this context survival, in
terms of both the personal and business, is aptly described as dependent on
networks. 177 Without such networks it would be impossible to conduct
business. Consider the following explanation from a study of a Chinese
business community:
In a community almost totally oriented toward business transactions,
sun yung was the most important aspect of a person's character and not
merely a quality to be considered in economic affairs. Sun yung referred
not only to credit, in the sense of goods or services lent without
immediate return against the promise of future payment ... it further
carried the connotation of a person's total reputation for trustworthiness
and in this sense was a statement of a person's social and psychological
characteristics as well as strictly economic reliability. 178
Again, it is such relationships and deep evaluations of business partners that
set Asian business practices apart from Western practice. This investigation
and careful evaluation of business partners is something different from
concerns identified by law and economics scholars as stigma: it is not a
mere economic calculation of the costs of scandal or due diligence done in
contemplation of a transaction but a weighing of the trustworthiness and
loyalty of a potential business partner through thick and thin regardless of
fault or cost.
Overlaying the difficulties of ambiguity of language, general disdain
for law, a distrust of law, and a lack of a commercial law tradition is a
tradition of strategic thinking and wily behavior. As Glenn puts it: "think
174 Chen, supra note 53, at 20-21; see also GLENN, supra note 3, at 310 n.37.
175 S. GORDON REDDING, THE SPIRIT OF CHINESE CAPITALISM 66 (1993).
176 Id. at 66-68.
117 Id. at 54-57.
178 Id. at 67-68.
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of all the Chinese stratagems, all the wiles for getting where you need to be,
for circumventing the bureaucracy, for achieving personal goals against all
odds." 179 He adds for illustrative purposes the old Chinese adage: "Always
kill with a borrowed knife.
180
C. Experience & Expectations in the West: Commitment to Courts
Those of Western colonial tradition have come to rely extensively on
law. The laws of England were considered the laws of most colonies from
their inception. For example, the laws of England were part of Australian
law until recently, when the right to appeal to the English Privy Council
was terminated. Anglo countries are deemed to be Rule of Law states
because of their separation of powers (thin version) and liberal democracy
(thick version). For that reason, certain expectations or norms will be
expected with respect to how the law will both assist and limit the ways in
which business will be conducted.
As evident in the traditional saying "possession is nine-tenths of the
law," the English common law in addition to criminal law, has traditionally
focused on matters of contract and private property. Likewise, former
British colonies have well-developed contract and private property laws.
Where matters of property and contract are in dispute, there is no social
inhibition among Anglo businesses to retain lawyers and commence legal
proceedings. It is expected that courts will function relatively efficiently
and transparently. Indeed, the last decade's reforms of corporate law in
Australia, for example, have been focused on just such matters, and
accordingly have been appropriately entitled the Corporate Law Economic
Reform Program. In thinking about how businesses will operate their
corporate and commercial activities in Australia, legal considerations will
be among the top concerns.
181
179 GLENN, supra note 3, at 321.
180 Id.
181 Professor Roman Tomasic claims that Australian corporate law can hardly be called
"Rule of Law." In support of his claim he cites empirical studies for applications for
permission to avoid compliance with law, which are at such a high level as to "undermine
claims that the Rule of Law is a characteristic of legal-making in relation to business in
market-based societies." Roman Tomasic, Company Law and the Rule of Law in China, 4
AuST. J. CoRP. L. 21 (1995). The issue of the Rule of Law in this context may be framed
differently in that the very effort required and decision to comply with law by seeking
permission and the transparency in the exercise of governmental discretion permit this
activity to fall well within the Rule of Law. The professor himself realizes this in his
comment that these activities serve toward "legitimization and system maintenance." Id. at
21. Rule of Law does not require that every letter be followed; rather, it requires that the law
be complied with, in this case, by the appropriate filings and dispensations. See an
interesting discussion on the topic and a critique of Professor Tomasic's article in Bahrin
Kamarul, Western Economic Law and Asian Resistances, 5 AuST. J. CORP. L. 84 (1995).
Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of Law
26:225 (2006)
Furthermore, Australia is considered to have a relatively low level of
corruption in its legal system and there appears to be little suspicion of or
actual corruption in the judiciary. 182 It ranked eighth out of 133 countries
on the Corruptions Perception Index in 2003.18 Accordingly, it is not
unreasonable to assume that a party in a dispute would appeal for
governmental intervention in the form of a court proceeding as it would be
a reasonable anticipation that such intervention will bring about a
predictable legal result instead of an arbitrary result on the basis of
corruption of the government's legal process.
This view of the situation is also reflected in the Western view of a
contract. American lawyer, business consultant and Chinese resident, L.
Brahm writes:
The Western legal mindset understands a contract as a document which
is legally binging and to which a company has legal recourse should
anything go wrong. In other words if the other party 'breaks' their side
of the bargain, you can sue them and drag them through the courts.
84
These experiences would lead Australians in a business dispute to expect a
transparent legal system, with a reasonable amount of speed (cases lasting
perhaps a few years), with a firm recognition of private property rights and
a formal, binding, and inflexible view of contracts. Furthermore, Australian
business people would not plan to corrupt a judge in the deciding of a case.
For the Westerner wishing to do business in China, Brahm states that the
problem lies: "with the Western party who insists on adopting a Western
legalistic approach to the practical reality of doing business in China."'
' 85
D. Experience & Expectations in China: Guanxi, Corruption, and Cash
Unlike Australia, Chinese law, as previously mentioned, has tended to
focus on criminal law. Accordingly, its private law had not been well
developed prior to 1949 and, indeed, has been outlawed at times since 1949.
In addition, there was a near complete abandonment of law-making during
the Cultural Revolution, leaving large gaps in the legal fabric of the Chinese
socialist experiment.' 86 Unsurprisingly, since embarking on its Open Door
Policy the development of private law has been a high priority for the CCP
182 Peter Roberts, Transparency International Country Study Report Australia 2004,
http://www.transparency.org.au/documents/CNISA.pdf.
183 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2004,
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/download/gcr2004/1 0_CountryreportsAK.pdf.
184 LAURENCE BRAHM, WHEN YES MEANS No: THE ART OF NEGOTIATING IN CHINA 45
(2003).
185 Id.
186 WANG, supra note 33, at 11.
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and even more so since its larger socio-politico-economic reforms of the
1990's, during which time it has passed hundreds of laws dealing with
economic and commercial matters.
Despite these legal reforms and efforts to raise the esteem of law,
Chinese law has not kept up either in quantity, quality, interpretation by the
courts, or in terms of enforcement. Chinese society has not come to view
law as a highly respected or credible institution. Indeed, the lack of respect
for law is notable in such events as attacks on judges and an on-going
feeling of, if not contempt, at least low esteem of the law among CCP
officials.'88
As Kui Wang observes, there remains a general mistrust of the law
among the Chinese. 189 Thus, although the law has been elevated in society
and promoted by the CCP, this change does not make the law the primary
organ for dispute resolution or even guidance in society. Rather, business
in China continues with "party policies, governmental powers, the network
of all kinds of social relations and the rampant protectionism"'1 90 such that
law becomes a weaker alternative to social and hence commercial
orderings.
Conventional wisdom notes that the Chinese view commercial
relationships and their contracts in a way that is different from Western
business professionals. This difference has been characterized as follows:
"[Chinese] conceptualize contractual promises in a less formal fashion than
do foreigners. The Chinese tend to view a contract as an expression of a
long-term cooperative and friendly relationship [rather than as a legal
document with legal ramifications]." ' 91 Again Brahm offers the following
insight:
The contract should be viewed as a tool by which both [parties] can be
assured that the other party understands what they understand, and
everybody knows what they have to put into the deal to make it work,
and what everyone will get out at the end of the day if it does work ...
[and every]one rests assured that everyone understands everyone else so
that no disputes will arise at all and the deal can work and everyone will
work together to achieve that goal.
92
187 Id. at 12-13.
188 Id. at 37.
189 Id. at 38.
190 Id. (WANG contains a subheading entitled "Corruption and bribery in the judicial
system").
191 DAVID FLINT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS FOR FDI: A COMPARATIVE REVIEW
UTrLIzING AUSTRALIA AND CHINA IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
THE LAW 110 (1996) (bracketed material found in WANG, supra note 33, at 37).
192 BRAHM, supra note 184, at 46.
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This description is sure to send shivers down the spine of any Western-
trained lawyer. The Chinese view is quite pragmatic-the issue is not my
rights and obligations versus your rights and obligations. Rather, the issue
is can we agree to commit to each other to see this project through? If so,
we will all do whatever is necessary to get the project finished and we can
all gain.
Chinese relationships with family and friends develop into strong
bonds and these special relationships, or "guanxi," appear to be an integral
part of commercial relations in China. 193 As Glenn observes:
[A] society of social relations, of guanxi, may easily slide towards
cronyism, the ongoing cultivation of reciprocal, unjustified advantage,
to the exclusion of considerations of the outside world.... It becomes
difficult to distinguish the loyalties which are rooted and justifiable,
even though the less responsive to outside need, from those which are
transient or parasitic, designed simply to leach away the resources.
194
The notion of relationships, loyalty and duty remains much higher in China
than in the West. 195  The importance of relationships is evident in
business, 196 and the role of family in the corporation' 97 is prevalent
throughout the new economy despite the changes to law. In fact, a parish
priest's relationship with the Church in Rome is said to be "guanxi" at least
as it pertained to Rome providing economic support for the church.' 98 Gray
observes: "those below look for patrons, those above for clients.... The
Chinese instinct is not to expose and condemn privilege, but to seek to
share its advantages by becoming the client of a privileged individual."' 99
Guanxi is part of the larger social order. Gray describes it thus:
Most Chinese continue to feel (rather than to think) that conflict is
deplorable; that any sectional interest is likely to be inimical to the
public welfare; ... that personal obligations between superior and
193 REDDING, supra note 175, at 40-78; see also Shaomin Li, Why Is Property Right
Protection Lacking In China? An Institutional Explanation, CAL. MGMT. REV., Spring 2004,
at 109.
194 GLENN, supra note 3, at 324.
195 It is not that these relationships do not exist in the West or that they may not be more
important than even the law. Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that at times they may
well be. See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); ROBERT JACKALL,
MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988); ROMAN TOMASIC, CASINO
CAPITALISM? INSIDER TRADING IN AUSTRALIA (1991).
196 See REDDING, supra note 175, at 40-78.
197 Philip Lawton, Berle and Means, Corporate Governance and the Chinese Family
Firm, 6 AUST. J. CORP. L. 348, 370 (2006).
198 PETER HESSLER, RIVER TOwN: Two YEARS ON THE YANTGZE 224 (2002).
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inferior, rather than impersonal and impartial relationships, provide the
better ethical basis for the conduct of public affairs .... 200
Certainly, guanxi is unlikely to stop on the steps of the courthouse. A judge
is expected to provide a judgment in favor of a friend or relative. Although
changes to the law have prevented judges from sitting on cases involving
family, associates, or friends, it is deemed normal for a judge to mention to
a fellow judge that in a case she or he is deciding one of the parties is of
particular importance to the fellow judge, and naturally, the favor can be
expected to be returned.
Corruption of the judiciary is apparently a long standing problem
tolerated by the Confucians 2 1 (one can consider the above example of the
father and son shielding one another as correct) and appears to continue as a
common complaint among legal practitioners, scholars and the populace
alike. 202 Further corruption is not limited to government officials taking
bribes.20 3 Government officials' law-breaking undermines claims for a
Rule of Law state - simply put, it is unfair to force the populace to obey
the law if the officials do not. The issue of corruption has certainly been
exacerbated in recent times as scholars have observed that "money is the
new religion" in China.20 4  Indeed, one commentator has written that
"Communist ideology is largely ignored as irrelevant. The entrepreneurial
spirit fills the air.",205 As to its corruption, China ranked 71 of out of 146
countries in a 2004 report by Transparency International, 20 6 by no means an
enviable spot. Corruption may well be part of the reason for many of the
calls for the Rule of Law.20 7 Perhaps in part responding to this complaint,
the CCP interference in judicial decision-making appears to have waned in
the last decade. 0 8 Despite China's efforts, however, it is unlikely that
corruption will be wiped out quickly or completely.
In addition to the matter of non-Western understandings of contract
rights, property law remains exceedingly fragile. Indeed, a 2004 study of
property rights in China seeks to explain "why property right [not just
200 Id.
201 GLENN, supra note 3, at 324.
202 See, e.g., WANG, supra note 33, at 30; Li, supra note 193, at 100-14; Chen, supra
note 53, at 160.
203 Gray makes the observation that corruption "is perhaps China's most serious
problem." GRAY, supra note 49, at 436.
204 Hsu, supra note 35, at 950.
205 Id.
206 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 score,
http://www.globalcorruptionreport.org/gcr2005/download/english/country-reportsaj.pdf.
207 Chen, supra note 53, at 155; Lubman, supra note 51, at 317; Li, supra note 193, at
109.
208 Cao, supra note 112, at 241.
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intellectual property] violation is still rampant in China.'' 209 The author
discusses three cases that can only be described as demonstrating a
shocking disregard of property rights (with government connivance), at
least from a Western point of view. 210 Also problematic are government
appropriations that under-compensate owners, allegedly by as much as
80%.21' Among the recommendations is that China establish strong
personal private property rights and work toward the increase of informal
respect for private property.
Combined, these factors have likely affected Chinese business interests
to expect a prompt resolution to business disputes. Where a court is
involved, judges are paid the necessary amount, the preferred outcome is
obtained, and business carries on as before. Chinese business people are
likely to see the law as flexible, contracts as guidelines rather than rules and
less than directly enforceable legal instruments. Further, Chinese
expectations would not include a bar to access to what Western business
officials would see as inviolable property rights. Finally, the matter of
corruption of government officials and their connivance with private parties
in the expropriation of private property would be an expected, predictable
norm.
VI. A SPECIAL PROBLEM OF BILATERAL TRADE AND THE
PROMISE OF A RULE OF LAW SOLUTION
These contradictory views of the role of law in business are likely to
cause substantial difficulty for both private parties and governments alike as
trade increases under a Free Trade Agreement as predicted by the
governments of both China and Australia. Unlike the WTO, which China
recently joined, bilateral trade agreements usually grant rights to private
parties. Accordingly, rather than dealing with acrimony between states on
an international stage, bilateral trade agreements (and multi-lateral trade
agreements) grant rights to private parties vis-A-vis other states. Such being
the case, it puts states in the peculiar position of having to answer to private
citizens of foreign nations for their policies and decisions. In China in
particular, where the state on the one hand has not been forced to answer to
its own citizens (both through the CCP's refusal to subject itself to the law
and by its control of the press) and on the other hand has been free of
scrutiny in its dealings with matters pertaining to the economy, it will be a
209 Li, supra note 193, at 100.
210 See id. Li analyzes the cases of Beijing McDonald's vs. Li Ka-shing, Nantung Unistar
Electro-Mechanical Industries Co., and Weipang Composites Resources Co.
211 Matthew Forney, Crude Fight: Wildcat drillers in China are battling Beijing after
their oil wells were seized, TIME AsiA, July 25, 2005, at 33.
212 Li, supra note 193, at 11. Numerous authors cited in this paper have also noted this
and offered the same recommendation.
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struggle to address such matters.
The second problem for China with a trade agreement with a non-
Asian partner is the inability to rely on certain Asian norms213 for problem
resolution. Where different cultures come into contact there is a need to
find a means to communicate a common system of signs accessible to both
in order to address both differences and commonalities, and the needs and
wants of the parties. Australia, a country whose culture is predominantly
Western, lacks the traditions that facilitate dispute resolution in the more
closely related cultures of East Asia. Accordingly, Australia looks to law to
resolve a dispute. The dispute is resolved by appealing to someone outside
the relationship to resolve the differences in a way that is impartial to the
parties.
The obvious corollary holds true as well: China lacks the traditions of
the West. The Chinese way involves drawing in more people involved with
the dispute to resolve the difference. It does not appeal to parties,
"outsiders," or non-Chinese to resolve what is essentially seen as a
relationship problem. The difference between the approaches and the lack
of a shared tradition creates a dilemma-is one to follow the other, or is
there a solution independent of each yet accessible to both? Certainly,
given the previously outlined problems associated with the legal system in
China, it would seem that neither party is likely to be confident or satisfied
as to the impartiality of any decision handed down in that context. By
default, holding the resolution of disputes in Australia hardly seems likely
either to garner much support or to provide an aura of justice.
As the Chinese traditions appear to be more culture-bound and hence
implicit and informal, they are not particularly accessible to an outsider. In
order to access these Chinese traditions one must be Chinese (or at least
perceived to be Chinese). Australians, too, are culture-bound and their
solution is also equally appealing to people of their culture. Australia, with
its own customs and context, although perhaps more explicit than Chinese
culture, is still a foreign culture to the Chinese.
213 The term "Asian norms" here is loosely used to refer to a preference for extra-legal
methods of conflict resolution (or at least extra-legal from the Western point of view),
including relying on business networks, political alliances and other social relationships,
which exist in part because of the problems of the legal system in China discussed above and
elsewhere in Asia, and in part because of the traditions also referred to above. It is not meant
to imply that there is a harmonious "Asian value" system spreading from Arabia to Japan.
See Randall Peerenboom, Social Networks, Civil Society, Democracy and Rule of Law: A
New Conceptual Framework, in THE POLITICS OF RELATIONALITY: CIVIL SOCIETY,
ECONOMICS, AND LAW IN EAST ASIA (Chaibong Hahm & Daniel Bell eds., 2003); Randall
Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates about "Values in
Asia " (UCLA, School of Law Research Paper No. 02-23, 2002); see also, Benedict Sheehy,
Singapore, "Shared Values" And Law: Non East Versus West Constitutional Hermeneutic,
34 HONG KONG L.J. 67 (2004).
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It is perhaps here, in this gap between cultures created by a bilateral
trade agreement, that the ideal and the promise of the Rule of Law, with its
explicit, formal methods, may be admirably well-suited. As a concept
understood by and accessible to both parties, it may well be the best
alternative. Law is understood by both cultures to be a restraint on
behavior. The applicability and role of law is different, however, both
clearly see law as limiting the worst behavior, among other things. Further,
both understand the potential for law to be a limit on the actions of all
parties, including governments, and to serve as a guide to acceptable action
for all parties including law making, promulgation, enforcement and
acceptance, again including governments. In sum, both parties have a sense
of the formal, or thin, Rule of Law and are not inimical to it, at least from a
cultural perspective. Therefore, if the Rule of Law can be held out as a
mutually acceptable model for commercial dispute resolution, it may hold
some promise for both governmental and private participants with respect
to Free Trade Agreements.
To achieve the Rule of Law, however, will take some strategic
thinking. Simply waiting for progress to result from China's commitments
to global agreements and its planned internal developments is unlikely to
satisfy foreign enterprises wishing to participate in the Chinese market.
The issue of the Rule of Law in the context of international trade has been
raised before. There was comment on the importance of the Rule of Law
for China when it acceded to the WTO.2 14 Analysis of China's progress in
that regard, however, has not been overly promising, in part simply because
of the complexity involved and the number of changes that need to be
made. 1 5 China's system of central governance and local control is poorly
coordinated, and local laws can be made which contradict centrally
developed legislation. Furthermore, there is no overall legislation or means
of determining the resolution of such conflicts either in favor of the local or
central government. This lack of direction and practice, particularly when
combined with the above noted issue of corruption, creates more than a
mild threat to those whose affairs may come under the jurisdiction of any
one of the many levels of government.
Furthermore, it seems unwise to rely on reforms promised under the
conditions of accession to the WTO given that the WTO is a matter of
national government and policy. Such being the case, these WTO
214 Jainming, supra note 159, at 379. See also, Peter K. Yu et al., China and The WTO:
Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003) (particularly the comments
of Yu on page 3 and Hom on page 23); Stanley Lubman, The Study of Chinese Law in the
United States, 2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 28, 31 (2003).
215 Gregory Fennell, The People's Republic of China's Ability to Comply with the
Standards Mandated by the World Trade Organization, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
613 (2002). See also WANG, supra note 33, at 146-47, 173-74.
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commitments are not as likely to have a bearing on individual private
enterprise or to address matters of credibility necessary in specific litigation
or disputed matters. Accordingly, awaiting the broad-based promised
changes necessary to comply with WTO commitments seems to be a poor
strategy without particularly promising results.
As the Rule of Law, at least in its formal or thin version, implies no
specific set of institutions, the situation facing both countries permits a
fresh look at what an institution which would embody the Rule of Law in
this particular instance would look like and how it should be designed.
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A TRADE DISPUTE PANEL
As in most Free Trade Agreements, it will be necessary to establish
some institutions, usually including a trade dispute panel. This panel will
not only deal with matters of the interpretation of the obligations of the
governments to the agreement, but also often provides judgments to
particular parties in litigation. Given the radically different legal systems
and traditions, it will be difficult for either party to accept wholeheartedly
the other's approach and hence, there may well be a high level of
dissatisfaction with outcomes.
There are a number of common solutions which include, of course,
panels of experts composed of members from both jurisdictions. The
obvious problem in this situation is that in panels of uneven numbers, it
ought to be anticipated that members of different traditions would be most
inclined to see things the same way and hence most likely to issue
judgments along lines of traditional affiliation than on points of law. Were
this to occur, the credibility of the panels and ultimately the agreement
would be seriously eroded. Accordingly, it may well be that a different
approach needs to be taken in the peculiar case of Australia and China.
As previously discussed, members of each tradition have different
expected processes and outcomes when they appeal to institutional dispute
resolution. Given this fact, it may well be wise to have such expectations
identified, distinguished, and addressed within the agreement. Expectations
that need to be addressed would include a time frame for hearings and
decision making, in addition to basic procedural issues such as means of
initiating procedures, notice periods and notifications of pending action.
It may be that looking to other methods and jurisdictions is the best
alternative. In this context, Singapore offers an interesting alternative. It is
a multi-cultural center with strong roots in both common law and Chinese
culture. Furthermore, Singapore, in looking at its economic development,
recognized its strength in the common law tradition and its importance as
an international center for commerce in Asia. Accordingly it embarked on
a program of establishing itself as a center for the arbitration of
international commercial disputes. It has established a highly regarded,
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independent, non-profit arbitration practice, the Singapore International
Arbitration Centre,21 6 which lists distinguished lawyers from around the
world including both Australia and the PRC. 217 Given its combination of
straddling cultures, independence from both, and strong Western Rule of
Law tradition, it may be particularly well suited to dealing with problems
arising from the proposed Australia-China Free Trade Agreement. Even if
the jurisdiction is not moved, it may be both possible and desirable to have
a contribution to dispute resolution tribunals from Singapore.
The other element that may be preferable to an aggressive Western
litigious approach would be drawing substantially more arbitration into the
dispute resolution model. That being so, it may be desirable to impose
arbitration, giving it a central place in the dispute resolution process. This
approach is well accepted by businesses in China as a way of avoiding the
potentially corrupt courts, in addition to offering some further control of the
outcome of the decision. Furthermore, even in various Western
jurisdictions there is a trend toward further exploration of the arbitration
model in litigation, and in particular in commercial disputes, and a move
away from the Western tradition of purely adversarial dispute resolution.2 8
Of course arbitrators will come with their own biases, and again, given
Singapore's successful bridging of the two cultures and well developed
arbitration institutions it could well contribute arbitrators, the arbitration
model offers an important step away from the exclusive adversarial model.
This arbitration approach combined with the other proposed alternative-
varying the jurisdiction-may hold the best promise for commercial dispute
resolution where two dramatically different traditions come into contact.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The traditions of China and Australia are strikingly different and will
come to pose a challenge for parties in both countries and for the nations
themselves in developing the extended relationships contemplated by the
FTA. Given these differences, it will be important to remain cognizant of
how they affect views, practices and approaches to law, business, and
dispute resolution. Each party can and must recognize the different
development and tradition represented by the other and accord it respect.
These traditions have developed each in its own way, each solving the
problems in a way understood and accepted within its own frame of
reference. Shifts in tradition may well be the only constant; however, the
current trend of globalization is increasing the extent and speed of such
shifts, and by so doing, increasing the pressure not only on the traditions,
216 Information available at http://www.siac.org.sg/spore.htm.
217 See the list of international panel members at http://www.siac.org.sg/intnal-panel.htm.
218 This is embodied in the ADR movement popular in many Anglo jurisdictions.
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but on the individual members of the traditions. In the case of such
changes, the number of people in these pressure situations and the sizable
stakes often involved, not only in terms of money and time, but also such
other things as jobs, environment, and lives, a broader understanding and
deeper sympathy is imperative.
No one party has a monopoly on the correct way to resolve disputes,
nor on the correct version of the Rule of Law. Learning the other party's
approach to dispute resolution is a worthwhile endeavour teaching about the
mundane matters of commerce as well as the loftier matters of the
coordination of society and solutions to collective problems. Working
through such disputes in different contexts will develop a greater
appreciation for the collective wisdom of human-kind and the ingenuity of
societies, other than our own, for resolving differences.
Finally, it is also humbling to recognize that the Rule of Law,
whatever its specific embodiment, remains an ideal for all. Its
interpretation, development and application are not determined. It, like all
ideals, will never be more than an effort at a continual process of
improvement. The Rule of Law ideal will continue to have profound
effects on both countries and their peoples as the governments alternatively
approach and withdraw from it. Still, it is an ideal worth pursuing because
it will provide a remarkably hardy bridge in assisting parties to
communicate across cultures for the greater good of humans everywhere
and in the day to day concerns of commerce.
